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This article aims to provide a novel conceptual understanding of the nature of the global mass surveillance policies and practices 
revealed by whistleblower Edward Snowden in collaboration with the Guardian and Washington Post newspapers. The critical 
analysis and conceptual reinterpretation of state and corporate surveillance and its impact on the political agency of civil society is 
multidisciplinary. An intersection of Surveillance Studies, political philosophy, and global politics/international relations provides 
an overview of the policies and practices that states and corporations develop and implement in relation to information and 
communications technologies (ICT). Clarifying how contemporary society is global and digital, it analyzes the way in which 
political economies inform contemporary policies and practices of surveillance. A critical analysis of the relation of political 
economy to neoliberal governmentality, biopolitical technologies of power, and contemporary regimes of truth leads to posit that 
global mass surveillance is a technology of power deployed by a contemporary biopolitics of information and communication. A 
conceptual reinterpretation of Foucault’s notion of parrhesia and Mann’s notion of sousveillance leads to posit that parrhesiastic 
sousveillance is a sociopolitical and technologically-enabled modality of resistance that can resemantize contemporary politics of 





To those who speak the truth  
 
1. Why a global surveillance society? 
 
It should be no surprise that the Pulitzer Prize for Public Service was awarded in 2014 to the two 
newspapers, the Washington Post and The Guardian, which first published stories about the global 
surveillance scandal after the careful analysis and validation of the information and materials leaked to 
them by Edward J. Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor turned whistleblower. 
The Pulitzer Prize awarded the newspapers for their role in helping, by means of aggressive reporting, “to 
spark a debate on the relationship between government and the public over issues of security and privacy” 
after their revelation of “widespread secret surveillance by the National Security Agency” (The Pulitzer 
Prizes 2014). Snowden described this accolade, the highest awarded in United States journalism, as a 
vindication for those who believe the public has a role in government. He added that the efforts of brave 
reporters and their colleagues, despite extraordinary intimidation—which includes forced destruction of 
journalistic materials, inappropriate use of terrorism laws, and other mean of pressure—has led to what the 
world now recognizes as a work of vital public importance (The Guardian 14th April 2014). 
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What is surprising, in general terms, is the fact that there is nothing new about revelations of the global 
scale of surveillance of information and communications. During the fear of the threat that ‘the year 2000 
problem’ (Y2K) could represent to computer networks, digital documentation, and data storage 
worldwide, a particular network was revealed by the Australian Inspector General of Intelligence and 
Security, Bill Blick: ECHELON (BBC 3rd November 1999). Described at the time as a global surveillance 
network that used “the world's most sophisticated eavesdropping technology […] linked directly to the 
headquarters of the US National Security Agency” for data mining purposes, the British and American 
governments refused to admit that it existed (ibid.). Blick, however, revealed that the Australian Defence 
Signals Directorate (DSD) formed part of ECHELON (ibid.). The surveillance network’s capabilities and 
objectives were described as follows:  
 
Every international telephone call, fax, e-mail, or radio transmission can be listened to by 
powerful computers capable of voice recognition. They home in on a long list of key 




A report commissioned by the European Parliament (EP) on the nature of ECHELON “produced evidence 
that the NSA snooped on phone calls from a French firm bidding for a contract in Brazil. They passed the 
information on to an American competitor, which won the contract” (ibid.). The reporter who revealed 
this act of industrial espionage, Duncan Campbell, argued what many civil rights groups stated then: 
ECHELON could “be used to intercept almost any electronic communication, be it a phone conversation, 
mobile phone call, e-mail message, fax transmission, net browsing history, or satellite transmission” (BBC 
29th May 2001). The EP report, however, downplayed these claims. It stated that the majority of 
communications could not, due to technical reasons, be intercepted and that, when they could, it was 
possible only to do so at “a limited extent”. No matter how extensive ECHELON’s resources and 
capabilities could be, the mere volume of traffic made the exhaustive and detailed monitoring of all 
communications “impossible in practice” (European Parliament’s Temporary Committee on the 
ECHELON Interception System 11th July 2001: 11).  
 
Despite these conclusions, the report neither denied the existence of ECHELON nor that its member states 
did deploy global information and communications surveillance. It only contested the network’s mass 
intercept capabilities, considered to be more “limited” than what was being revealed. And yet, the report 
would recommend: the promotion, development, and manufacture of European encryption technology; the 
promotion of open-source software to guarantee that no backdoors be built into computer programs; and, 
the systematic encryption of the digital communications (e.g., emails) of European institutions, of public 
institutions of member states, and of its citizens, so that encryption of communications ultimately become 
the norm (idem: 19). It also readily admitted several legal and governmental problems: EU citizens’ data 
protection rights varied substantially from member state to member state and were hardly adequate in any 
case; the oversight of the activities of intelligence services required that member states’ national 
parliaments have formally structured monitoring committees (idem: 13). 
 
Nowadays it is known that ECHELON was but one of various surveillance programs that existed as a 
result of the United Kingdom—United States of America Agreement (UKUSA), which establishes 
cooperation in signals intelligence between the UK, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 
(European Parliament’s Directorate General for Internal Policies 2013: 12; 5). Snowden’s revelations 
evidence that the intelligence services of UKUSA member countries share technical surveillance 
capacities as well as vast troves of intercepted data (The Guardian 21st June 2013). They also evidence 
that the NSA and the British General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) further their global mass 
surveillance programs by means of the voluntary and/or involuntary assistance of global 
telecommunications and internet corporations (Timm 2014). The reasons for intelligence services’ 
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profound interest in the data collected by corporations are economical: internet giants such as Google and 
Facebook, whose free services cater to billions of consumers, are the principal innovators of online 
browsing data trackers, the main proponents for the reduction of online anonymity, and the world’s most 
important personal and targeted advertising services (Schneier 2013). In this sense, because surveillance 
is “the business model of the Internet”, argues Bruce Schneier, intelligence services have adopted the 
data collection practices of corporations as their own (ibid.). A fundamental contribution of Surveillance 
Studies, in this respect, is its efforts to clarify how global surveillance is not only confined to intelligence 
agencies’ deployment of surveillance technologies, but extends also to the very cultural and economic 
characteristics of contemporary society. 
 
There was perhaps so little done, so paltry an outcry, after the ECHELON revelations because the thought 
of a global surveillance society was considered conspiratorial at the time. Some years before Edward 
Snowden would become a whistleblower, the renowned Surveillance Studies scholar David Lyon would 
write in his primer on the discipline that:  
 
To talk about global surveillance certainly sounds conspiratorial, but […] [s]urveillance 
has become globalized just because economic and political processes are themselves 
globalized, for better or worse. […] The globalization of surveillance, just as with all other 
globalizations, is both a phenomena in its own right and something that takes place in 
different ways in different countries, producing situations of complex inter-relations. In 
some ways, surveillance is “glocalized” as local circumstances make a real difference to 
general trends.  
(Lyon 2011: 134-135) 
  
More recently, a Pew Research Center study that queried over 1400 experts on the internet showed that 
the majority of respondents shared the opinion that the greatest threats to the internet’s potential are states 
and corporations, specifically: state-based security and political control; state and corporate surveillance; 
and, corporate-based control over internet architecture and flows of information (Pew Research Internet 
Project 3rd July 2014). Crucial to understanding why surveillance has become global are the facts that 
contemporary society is itself global and digital. Global economy results from the interconnectedness of 
the world’s national economies, so reliant on each other that economic reforms enacted in the China can 
lead to the slowdown of the economies of the US and the European Union (EU) (The Guardian 24th March 
2014). An embodiment of the global economy, the world equities market, has depended already for 
decades on the desktop terminals and communication networks developed by media corporations such as 
Bloomberg L. P. and Thomson Reuters Corporation; in more recent years, the financial markets have even 
come to be dominated by digital machine learning-driven technologies (Institutional Investor 30th January 
2014), evidence of the digitalization and automatization of important aspects of contemporary society.  
 
Surveillance policies and practices can also be considered global, argue Kirstie Ball and David Murakami 
Wood, because they are part of the everyday life of the world’s various people (Ball and Murakami Wood 
2013: 1). The global surveillance society has resulted from the dynamics of “state and corporate 
priorities”. It is born from security and military functions, policing, and institutions such as the carceral 
and health and welfare systems. Ball and Murakami Wood explain, as does Schneier, that state concerns 
about security lead governments “to integrate the private sector into its goals as providers of intelligence 
on the consumers they serve […] [and to] annex corporate information systems into a securitised 
information infrastructure” (idem: 2-3). The synergy of state and corporate surveillance policies and 
practices, especially regarding information and communications, they argue, “have normalised and 
legitimised mass targeted surveillance deep within corporate, governmental and social structures” at the 
same time that “a blurring of the boundaries between public sector and private organisations” has occurred 
(idem: 2). In this sense, a multitude of “different practices of information management and surveillance” 
strengthen “a normalisation of surveillance as a life-practice” that is simultaneous to the use of “the 
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products of surveillance through organisations and systems” by “a corporate-state nexus” (idem: 3). Ball 
and Murakami argue that this corporate-state nexus does so in order to “increase flows that create 
opportunities for exploitation and profit and at the same time reduce the uncertainties and risks that come 
from bad circulations” (ibid.). This coincides, they explain, not only with what Michel Foucault termed 
security, but also with “a kind of emerging neoliberal global government” where security is taken to be the 
basic function of government—understanding government in this context as something more 
contemporary, “pervasive and networked” (ibid.) than governments from the past. For these numerous 
reasons, Ball and Murakami Wood have recommended that Surveillance Studies give “more serious 
attention to the political economy of surveillance”, especially to “the way in which surveillance works in 
and for government (in the broadest sense) at this global scale” (idem: 1-2). They recommend that an 
“integrated political economic analysis of surveillance” should engage seriously with the considerations of 
“policy and activist communities” so that the analysis can prove useful for “confronting and challenging 
the continued expansion and intensification of surveillance” (idem: 3). 
 
2. Why a political economy of surveillance? 
 
The previous section explained that our contemporary society, global and digital in scope, is also a global 
surveillance society. Not only states, but also corporations, deploy technologies that monitor global 
information and communications for different ends. The Snowden revelations evidence the extension of 
state and corporate surveillance to the social, political, and economic processes of civil society inasmuch 
as citizens and consumers. Although these threats are not entirely new, the ubiquitous role that 
information and communications technologies (ICT) have come to play in contemporary society is indeed 
a novel development. The fact that exact details about global mass surveillance are clearer to us than what 
they were a decade ago is also new. This section will clarify the way in which the technologies of power 
of our global surveillance society respond to the political economies of states and corporations. 
 
There are three contemporary tendencies at present that best exemplify the most prominent global and 
national policies and practices by which states and corporations concerning ICT. These can be briefly 
summarized as follows: 
 
• States securitize information and communications in the name of national security and 
defense priorities, developing and implementing local policies and practices that can also 
be enforced at the international, transnational, and global level by other states; 
 
The ongoing reporting on the NSA and the GCHQ surveillance scandal provides an in-depth appreciation 
for the ways in which states can conjointly deploy policies and practices of securitization of information 
and communications. Another example of the transformation of the domain of information and 
communications into a matter of national security (Deibert 2011: 24) is the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly resolution that the Russian Federation, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan presented in 
September 2011. The resolution proposed a code of conduct for information security and the protection of 
national sovereignty in information and communications—this “could give any state the right to censor or 
block international communications for almost any reason” as well as “could even be used for trade 
protectionism in cultural industries” (Internet Governance Project 20th September 2011). The 
securitization of information and communications at the national level is a common enough policy, but 
their attempted securitization at the level of international politico-economic blocs is a much more recent 
tendency in global politics. 
 
• States outsource prior state functions, such as surveillance, censorship, and policing of 
information and communications, to corporations; although numerous corporations 
perform these functions as their raison d'être, in the case of others, ‘outsourcing’ does not 
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necessarily imply that the corporation in question is a contractor, since corporations can 
also be legally coerced to perform these functions under national security claims; 
 
Snowden’s revelations have evidenced that the NSA and the GCHQ collaborate with a number of global 
internet corporations, even if the exact terms in which these collaborations occur continue to be unclear 
(New York Times 7th June 2013). In addition, a number of corporations gather information and provide 
analyses and advice to states as commercial services—for example, Booz Allen Hamilton Inc and 
Lockheed Martin to the US government (New York Times 9th June 2013). Furthermore, an international 
surveillance technology industry is expanding: various corporations specialize in providing states with 
advanced communication surveillance technologies. This global trade, calculated to be worth 3 to 5 billion 
US dollars a year, has already reached an annual growth rate of 20 per cent (Amnesty International 4th 
April 2014). These facts show, without a doubt, a swelling neoliberalization of state functions, especially 
those concerned with security and intelligence, as well as a number of industries that commercialize the 
monitoring, collection, and meticulous processing of vast amounts of information and communications. 
 
• States’ economic and political interests and corporations’ lobbying efforts are synergetic 
when it comes to the enactment of international treaties and legislations, which sidestep 
parliamentary discussion on ICT policies and practices as well as national consultation 
mechanisms with civil society on the same matters. 
 
The most notable of these international treaties are bilateral free trade agreements, such as the infamous—
and defeated—Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). Ongoing negotiations on the 
Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are negotiated at a distance from existent 
multilateral trade institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). These treaties are the results 
of efforts made by the US, the EU, and international corporations to establish their own preferences for 
global trade and their proposals for (de)regulation (New York Times 8th October 2013). Concerning 
information and communications, states and corporations share an interest in ever harsher and more 
restrictive intellectual property and copyright provisions (Cardoso et al. 2014: 5), so as to exert more 
control over the flow of ICT content. There is also the concern that they share an interest in attempting to 
trump existing data protection regulations (Ruddy 2014: 97), primarily driven by security and economic 
incentives. Several ACTA-based proposals that continue to be found in leaked draft documents of the 
ongoing treaties—for example, the CETA (La Quadrature du Net 20th October 2013) —cause significant 
worry, since they could lead to “global consequences for digital freedoms” (Electronic Frontier 
Foundation 2012). 
 
Contemporary tendencies in state and corporate policies and practices concerning ICT include various 
aspects of securitization, censorship, and surveillance. Identifying these tendencies allows for clarifying 
the implications of what is emerging and developing quite rapidly in our contemporary surveillance 
society: a global political economy of surveillance. Kirstie Ball and Laureen Snider explain political 
economy as “the interconnection of social, economic, and political processes” (Ball and Snider 2013: 1) 
They share with this article the opinion that our global surveillance society is driven by the political 
economies desired by its most dominant players, which are also its two most “massive configurations of 
power”: the state and the corporation (idem: 1-2). For this reason, Ball and Snider draw attention to “the 
embeddedness of surveillance processes within the activities and agendas of global capital and the state” 
(idem: 5). 
 
Zygmunt Bauman et al. also emphasize that the global nature of capital flows and politics has led to “a 
complex interaction between public and private agencies, not least agencies of corporate and market 
capital rather than of liberal citizenship” (Bauman et al. 2014: 136). These complex state-corporate 
dynamics are brought upon, they argue, by “the conjunction of three processes that have become 
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interwoven: transnationalization, digitization, and privatization.” Global flows of privatized digital data, in 
turn, have led to “a much larger transformation affecting the way the boundaries of national security 
function” (idem: 126). In the same manner as corporations, states do not care to grasp only the information 
and communications data that is produced, distributed, and stored within their sovereign territorialities, 
but also those that flow through them and elsewhere. 
 
Almost every nuance of the lives of individuals and the dynamics of populations is encoded in global 
privatized flows of digital traces. Therein resides corporations’ economic interest in digital surveillance of 
internet users. Ball and Snider explain that this is why commerce has shaped and continues to shape 
surveillance, since corporations are those that “funded, designed, legitimized and built the machineries of 
surveillance” that exist nowadays (Ball and Snider 2013: 3-4) They argue that the development of 
cyberspace also spurred and continues to spur what Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson termed 
‘computerized dataveillance’. Digital surveillance is expanding not only for marketing purposes, but also 
because the digitalization of records allows for citizens, customers, employees, and those defined as 
‘criminals’ to be “reconstructed through the aggregation of data collected in bits of information from a 
myriad of sources […] [to then be] disassembled and reassembled to suit the priorities and interests of the 
institution involved” (idem: 4). 
 
Until very recently, Ball and Snider remind us, these digital technologies focused on developing “new and 
better methods of controlling and punishing the designated ‘other’” (idem: 5). The technology of power 
that is digital surveillance, they argue, has become a “key component of governance and of commerce”. 
For Ball and Snider, “dataveillance of the Web allows the entire communication process to be turned into 
a commodity, packaged and sold” (ibid.); for this very reason, states also find it to be a particularly 
interesting technology of power. Bauman et al. explain that states have adopted the digital surveillance 
practices of corporations because: 
 
The subject of surveillance is now a subject whose communicative practices are seen by 
the surveillance agencies as of potential informational value or utility, where this value 
might be related to security or the economy. 
(Bauman et al. 2014: 138) 
 
What exactly is sought by states when they deploy economic digital surveillance continues to be unclear, 
but the strategic mission list that the NSA published in January 2007 states that “ensuring U.S. economic 
advantage and policy strategies” is among its priorities (International New York Times 2nd November 
2013). Snowden’s revelations have evidenced NSA surveillance of corporations such as Petróleo 
Brasileiro S.A. and China Telecom Corporation Limited as well as of prominent decision-makers in 
economic matters, Joaquín Almunia, Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for 
Competition, among them (New York Times 20th May 2014). Other revelations indicate that NSA 
surveillance of the entire mobile telephony network of certain countries—for example, the renowned 
financial services center or “tax haven” that is the Bahamas (The Intercept 19th May 2014). Hence, for 
Bauman et al., “far from a seamless flow of information, power relations structure the game” (Bauman et 
al. 2014: 127) that states play by means of global mass surveillance: a structurally asymmetric balancing 
of political and economic interests that happens to occur under the guise of reciprocal international 
collaborations on antiterrorism.  
 
Bauman et al. share Ball and Murakami Wood’s argument that the corporate-state nexus deploys a 
neoliberal apparatus of security. The success of the complex interaction between states and corporations 
relies on “a security apparatus which, as Foucault tells us, does not function along the model of repression, 
but rather one of production, of allowance and license. This is the triumph that is liberalism” (idem: 139). 
Contemporary mass surveillance functions by exploiting a global ICT infrastructure in which information 
and communications content flows seamlessly and uninterruptedly through transnational networks. This 
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recalls the laissez faire attitude of neoliberal political economies, which also wants capital to flow 
incessantly. Zeynep Tufekci has written, in relation to what she terms computational politics, that “modern 
social engineering operates by making surveillance as implicit, hidden and invisible as possible, without 
an observed person being aware of it”; for Tufecki, our contemporary surveillance society functions “in a 
manner opposite of the panopticon” (Tufekci 2014). 
 
Tufekci’s argument that our global surveillance society is also characterized by technologies of power that 
are neither disciplinary nor panoptical is an argument that this article shares. Global mass surveillance, 
even though it also deploys panoptical technologies of power, is biopolitical. The significance of the data 
contained in information and communications to state and corporate political economies, added to the fact 
that neoliberal governmentalities require what Foucault calls a regime of truth, justifies considering global 
mass surveillance as one of the technologies of power deployed by what can be understood as an emerging 
and rapidly developing biopolitics of information and communications. 
 
3. Why a biopolitics of information and communications? 
 
The previous section explained that global digital surveillance provides states and corporations with a 
technology of power that secures their economic and political interests. Within the context of a global and 
digital society, these political economies establish international and/or global policies and practices of 
surveillance of ICT, securitizing ICT infrastructure and networks as well as censoring their content so as 
to maintain political power and ensure economic profit. States and corporations develop and implement 
these either on their own, or by contracting/lobbying/coercing each other to do so, or by collaborating with 
each other due to economo-political synergies. The subjects of digital surveillance have economic and 
political utility and are fluid digital reconstructions, which can be framed as individuals within specific 
populations and as populations that are aggregates of specific individuals.  
 
The concept of a biopolitics of information and communications results from understanding that 
biopolitics and governmentality—that is to say, “the governmental regime called liberalism” (Foucault 
2008: 22) —are conceptually and theoretically intertwined. This is so because the central core of the 
problems they are concerned with is the same: the population (idem: 21). In addition, the concept sheds 
light on the fact that both governmentality and biopolitics are driven by the question of the economic truth 
within governmental reason (idem: 22). Foucault explains that governmentality can be understood as 
follows: 
 
The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, 
power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of 
knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.  
(Foucault 2007: 108) 
 
Governmentality employs knowledge based on political economy to establish the logics and forms of 
governing that will most optimally exert power over the population through the deployment of apparatuses 
of security. This understanding of governmentality is what leads Foucault to conceptualize the 
contemporary state as “nothing but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities” (Foucault 
2008: 77). Such a notion of the state is of particular interest since it explains why a government, inasmuch 
as a fluidly protean assemblage of governmentalities, may develop and implement contradictory policies 
and practices of its “mechanisms of security”, that is to say, contradictions in the interventions that have 
“the essential function of ensuring the security of the natural phenomena of economic processes or 
processes intrinsic to population” (Foucault 2007: 353). When we consider policies and practices 
concerned with information and communications, it is clear that a state may be committed to freedom of 
expression at the same time that it is committed to mass surveillance. This notion of the state, hence, 
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allows for considering that contradictions in policy and practices may be the result of independently 
established governmentalities, which are at odds with each other due to the vast differences in their 
technologies of power, modes of knowledge, and intended populations. In this sense, we clarify that the 
objectives of policies and practices as well as the institutions employed to secure these can often conflict 
with each other for the same reasons. 
 
Governmentality finds the need to establish a “particular regime of truth that finds its theoretical 
expression and formulation in political economy” (Foucault 2008: 29). For this reason, it establishes the 
market as the site of veridiction and the mechanism that allows it to “function with the least possible 
interventions precisely so that it can formulate its truth and propose it to governmental practice as rule and 
norm” (idem: 30). Contemporary biopolitics of information and communications also respond to the 
political and economic regime of truth of the global market. Bauman et al. urge us to carefully consider 
the “social and cultural shifts reshaping the acceptability of […] new practices of communication, new 
modes of knowledge, and rapid shifts in the expression of personal identity [because] […] they include the 
general shift to the market rather than state law as the ultimate measure of political and ethical value” 
(Bauman et al. 2014: 124). We have explained above that Schneier has a similar argument: he claims that 
the model for the information and communications industry, particularly for the internet industry, is that of 
surveillance. 
 
David Murakami Wood and Alexander Galloway have reinterpreted the Foucauldian notion of biopolitics 
so as to better explain contemporary societies of control and surveillance (Murakami Wood 2013: 317-
318; Galloway 2004: 81, 88). This article also reinterprets biopolitics, mostly to argue why global mass 
surveillance can be understood as state and/or corporate deployments of biopolitical technologies of power 
over information and communication. There are three central reasons for arguing that mass surveillance is 
biopolitical. The first is that biopolitics is a technology of power that is not “disciplinary” (Foucault 2003: 
242), and hence, not panoptical in nature, since it is not “individualizing” but “massifying” (idem: 243). 
The second is that biopolitics is a “technology of security […] or regulatory technology” (idem: 249) that 
deals “with the population as a political problem” (idem: 245) and that is concerned not only with 
“biological”, but also “biosociological processes characteristics of human masses” (idem: 250). Pioneering 
scientific fields in natural science, such as biosemiotics, posit that semiosis— “the production of signs” —
is fundamental to life and that, in this sense, each and every living system is a semiotic system (Barbieri 
2008: 1-2). As with every other animal species, obtaining information and communicating relevant 
information to others can be considered among the most crucial of human beings’ biosociological 
processes, fundamental to their individual and social dynamics. Biopolitics of information and 
communications represent a novel intrusion—without doubts or rival—into biosociological processes of 
acquisition and production of information and its circulation and distribution by the power of states and 
corporations. 
 
The third and last reason is that biopolitics of information and communication allows states and 
corporations to deploy a security apparatus that dovetails sovereign and disciplinary technologies of power 
(Foucault 2003: 38-40) alongside its biopolitical technologies of power (Foucault 2003: 242; 2007: 107-
108). Ball and Snider argue that surveillance is “the sociotechnical means through which the logic of 
juridical concepts articulate with social relations of commodity production, finding its expression in 
systems of public and private law”. In their opinion, contemporary surveillance constitutes “the 
institutional goals and biopolitical dimensions of modernity” (Ball and Snider 2013: 3). Without a doubt, 
besides the regulation of processes that results from biopolitical technologies of power, the biopolitics of 
information and communication also deploy as technologies of power the concepts and rules that result 
from ICT legislation enacted by sovereign power as well as the norms that institutions enforce so that 
individuals discipline and normalize their information and communications. Bauman et al. warn us that 
“we should clearly be very wary of the prospect of novel forms of inclusion and exclusion enacted through 
new technologies of population control” (Bauman et al. 2014: 136). 
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States and corporations legislate, discipline and normalize, and regulate the flows of information and 
communication processes because in global and digital societies, Manuel Castells argues, control over the 
circulation of information and its communications is always an indicator of political and economic power 
(Castells 2000: 695). The rapid development of ICT and their creative use in contemporary society is 
profoundly rebalancing social, economic, and political power. For these reasons, states and geopolitical 
blocs, global and national corporations, terrorist organizations, organized crime cartels, and—at a slower 
rhythm, but as surely—civil society (Castells 2005: 10) (constituted by a kaleidoscope of individuals and 
groups that include non-governmental organizations, whistleblowers, civil society organizations, cultural 
jammers, hacktivists, activists, consumers, and others), who voice national and global concerns, 
continuously vie to expand whatever mechanisms of power they may have at their disposal. Tufekci’s 
notion of computational politics, which illustrates contemporary social, economic, and political clashes 
over the power contained with information and communications, recalls Antonio Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony, “which emphasizes manufacturing consent, and obtaining legitimacy, albeit uses state and 
other resources in an unequal setting, rather than using force or naked coercion” (Tufekci 2014). 
 
Foucault is similarly concerned about the fact that truth—produced “only by virtue of multiple forms of 
constraint” and capable of inducing “regular effects of power” —is in every society established in 
accordance to a “general politics” or regime of truth (Foucault 1980: 131). The characteristics of a 
particular biopolitics of information and communication depend on the regime of truth that exists within 
the society upon which it is deployed. A regime of truth is “a system of ordered procedures for the 
production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements”, which is “linked in a circular 
relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and 
which extend it” (idem: 133). For Foucault, the regime of truth is “a condition of the formation and 
development of capitalism” (ibid.) and its neoliberal variant. Due to the fact that truth can be explained as 
“the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of 
power attached to the true”, Foucault argues that contestation over the truth are concerned with the 
economic and political role the truth plays in our societies (idem: 132). 
 
Hence, a “‘political economy’ of truth” establishes five important traits for veridiction in order to 
determine what is true in our contemporary societies. To be clear, truth: 1) is centered on the form of 
scientific discourses and the institutions that produce it; 2) is subject to constant economic and political 
incitement; 3) is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption; 4) is produced 
and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic 
apparatuses; and, 5) is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation around which 
ideological struggle occurs (idem: 131-132). Most instances of the public debate on the development and 
implementation of state and corporate policies and practices, especially those that concern surveillance 
and collection of personal data, are: explained and justified merely with econometric and statistical 
forecasts; addressed only in governmental press conferences and in the public relations campaigns of 
corporate lobbying efforts; and, usually confined to mainstream or ‘corporate media’ and its reporting. 
Foucault recognizes that the political question of “constituting a new politics of truth”, that is to say, of 
establishing a new “political, economic, institutional régime of the production of truth”, is not a matter of 
emancipating the truth from the structure of power, but detaching the power of the truth “from the forms 
of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time (idem: 133). The 
existence of a regime of truth leads states, corporations, and civil society to contest each other ‘for truth’; 
however, the contestation is not ‘on behalf’ of truth, but—as explained above—concerned with the status 
of truth and the economic and political role it plays (idem: 132-133). 
 
Ray Coleman and Michael McCahill clarify further the relation of regimes of truth to policies and 
practices of surveillance. They explain that surveillance, when deployed by a certain regime of truth, can 
also be quite deficient—especially when it comes to surveillance of that which is not in its own interest. 
State and corporate surveillance in those cases is a form of inspection that is “shaped less by discourses of 
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censure, discipline and control, as is the case with conventional crime, and more by a language of 
accommodation and compliance concerning the powerful”, which is to say: states and corporations can 
organize their policies and practices quite differently depending on the intended population, “each 
carrying different targeting strategies and messages in relation to the powerful and the powerless, 
respectively” (Coleman and McCahill 2011: 134). The population under surveillance and the technologies 
of power deployed upon them depend on the regime of truth that exists within that surveillance society. 
For this reason, surveillance policies and practices should be contested and resisted from a standpoint that 
analyzes modes of veridiction, techniques of governmentality, and practices of the self. For Foucault, the 
notion that allows for doing so is parrhesia, the ethical and political telling of the truth (Foucault 2011: 8-
9). 
 
4. Why a resistance of parrhesiastic sousveillance? 
 
The previous section explained that global mass surveillance is a state and/or corporate deployment of a 
biopolitical technology of power that regulates the biosociological processes of information and 
communication. It also explained that the contestation of state and corporate control over the regime of 
truth is even more important when we consider that their policies and practices extend not only to ICT 
infrastructure, networks, and content, but also to entire citizenries and global consumer markets. The 
notion of parrhesia, Foucault clarifies, involves courageously speaking the whole truth without reserves, 
despite the fact that it may place the speaker at risk of violence at the hands of the authority that is 
contested (Foucault 2011: 6; 9; 11). The biopolitics of information and communications of states and 
corporations employ cutting-edge scientific and technological developments. These mechanisms of 
control are deployed so ICT data traces can be thoroughly monitored and examined in order to govern 
populations more efficiently in accordance to electoral calculations, market imperatives, and security 
concerns. In contemporary surveillance societies, parrhesiastic action has important sociopolitical 
implications because it contests the regime of truth that attempts to ensure the political, economic, and 
social regulation and compliance of civil society inasmuch as citizens and consumers.1 Recent Snowden 
revelations evidence that GCHQ deploys covert tools over the internet to spread false information, 
manipulate the results of online polls, divert traffic to or away from websites and videos that are of their 
interest, and even permanently disable internet users’ accounts by infiltrating their computers (The 
Intercept 14th July 2014). This is particularly worrying because “most conceptions of democracy”, explain 
Bauman et al., “rest on some sense that people are able to think and make judgments for themselves” 
(Bauman et al. 2014: 137). Fortunately, the escalating development of ICT and their inventive use by civil 
society has also led to the emergence of numerous modalities of resistance that can contest the 
mechanisms of control of contemporary biopolitics of information and communication. Civil societies 
continue to develop their political agency and are learning to strengthen a nascent digital agency, both of 
which enable them to contest state and corporate regimes of truth as parrhesiastes that search for the 
resemantization of their social, economic, and political processes. 
 
In consequence, there are various important individual and collaborative actions of parrhesia in 
contemporary society that did not exist only a few decades ago. In general terms, we find alternative 
media organizations and citizen journalism that employ internet websites and blogs as well as social media 
                                                      
1 A recent example of research on the ways information and communications are spread through social media and 
the internet is the recently revealed study on “emotional contagion” that Facebook and Cornell University 
collaborated on in 2012. Others are several United States’ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
studies, started in 2011, which research social connections and communications in order to optimize informational 
warfare. The “emotional contagion” study was conducted on unwitting—and hence, uninformed—social media 
users, which were also subjects of information manipulation. Both studies were fundamentally interested in better 
understanding how to influence online communicative behavior in unaware populations. For more on these studies, 
do read: The Guardian 30th June 2014; and: The Guardian 8th July 2014. 
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networks to post and distribute their reporting. More specifically, there are whistleblowing organizations 
such as WikiLeaks have that globalized, online and offline, the revelations substantiated by carefully 
vetted materials sent anonymously to them by individuals and/or groups concerned by state and corporate 
wrongdoings and abuses. Quite recently, hacktivists and hacktivism collectives as well as collaborative 
networks that crowdsource open data analysis—which journalist Barrett Brown calls ‘pursuances’ (Brown 
2012)—have shed light upon the strategies by which the state-corporate nexus deploys espionage and 
persona management (i.e., using online identities for purposes of astroturfing or disinformation) to 
infiltrate or hinder the activities of non-profit organizations and sociopolitical activism groups (Masnick 
25th November 2013). Lastly, there are numerous national and international non-profit (NPO) and non-
governmental organizations (NGO) committed to establishing radical transparency of the state, 
corporations, and the media. These organizations investigate, report, and publicize their findings on a 
broad scope of topics, that cover state and corporate corruption, free and fair elections, environmental 
impact, consumer rights, freedom of information and of the press, corporate lobbying, and digital rights—
but to name a few. 
 
Parrhesiastic contestation of the regime of truth is also embedded within the social, economic, and 
political processes of contemporary surveillance society. Because of its commitment to detaching the truth 
from the economic and political hegemonies that control it, we cannot consider an ICT-enabled 
parrhesiastic action to embody the very biopolitics of information and communications it contests. 
However, the commitment of parrhesia to transparency appears to require that it share the interest of 
surveillance in monitoring and collecting data on certain individuals and populations. In order to clarify 
whether this is the case, it is fundamental to consider whether what appears as surveillance is not in fact 
something altogether different. 
 
Murakami Wood has questioned whether we should not begin to talk about “multiple and multiplying 
‘veillances’”, rather than simply ‘surveillance’, in order to understand the reception, reaction, and 
resistance to global surveillance (Murakami Wood 2013: 324). Steve Mann conceptualizes and theorizes 
from the intersection of Surveillance Studies and his technical trailblazing in the development of wearable 
computing, especially those devices that involve computational photography. From the standpoint of this 
technico-conceptual crossroad, Mann posits an understanding of surveillance that, although “commonly 
used to refer literally to visual signals”, also covers “other sensory signals and observational data in 
general” (Mann and Ali 2013: 243). Surveillance, for Mann, frequently exhibits the following traits: it is 
usually deployed from a fixed viewpoint, commonly architecture-centered, and attached to property; it 
establishes an “oversight” perspective, which watches from above; and, it is commonly initiated by 
property owners and/or its custodians, such as governments (Mann 2004: 626-627). Contemporary 
developments in wearable computing and ICT, such as “social networking, distributed cloud-based 
computing, self-sensing, body-worn vision systems, wearable cameras, and ego-centric vision” (Mann 
2014: 605), lead Mann to propose an alternative or counterpart to surveillance, which he terms 
sousveillance. Sousveillance, for Mann, exhibits the following traits: it is usually deployed from a mobile 
viewpoint, commonly human-centered, and worn by a person; it establishes an “undersight” perspective, 
which watches from below; and, it is commonly less hierarchical and more rhizomic than its counterpart, 
surveillance (Mann 2004: 626-627). In this sense, sousveillance seems to explain parrhesia more correctly 
and more in detail than surveillance does. To be clear, it is not necessary to consider every instance of 
parrhesia an instance of sousveillance and vice-versa, but we can argue that they may coincide quite often. 
Mann and Ferenbok intuit the potential for parrhesia of sousveillance when they argue that in 
contemporary society “people can and will not only look back, but in doing so [can and will] potentially 
drive social and political change” (Mann and Ferenbok 2013: 24). 
 
The notion of veillance that Murakami Wood considers could be helpful for certain Surveillance Studies 
research is the result of Mann’s considerations on surveillance and sousveillance as counterparts. For 
Mann, these similar, but different, alternatives indicate that there is a politically neutral watching or 
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sensing that does not necessarily involve social hierarchy (Mann 2014: 605). For this reason, this article 
shares the opinion that both of these conceptual understandings about the manners in which we monitor 
and store sensory signals and observational data are vital to the study of privacy, security, and trust. They 
serve to illustrate that in contemporary society, “we seek to measure, sense, display, and visualize 
veillance, regardless of whether it is surveillance or sousveillance” (ibid.). Mann and Adnan Ali posit that 
veillance is a purposeful action that produces an artifact. Such an artifact can be employed in 
socioeconomic contexts—for example, to enable greater trust in transactions, because it reduces the 
information asymmetry that exists between contracting parties (Mann and Ali 2013: 244). In this sense, 
this article posits that when veillance commits itself to political actions that contest the authority of a 
regime of truth it can also be understood as parrhesiastic. Mann and Ali argue that while surveillance 
monopolizes transactions for the party in a position of authority, sousveillance breaks down that same 
monopoly, since the distributed nature of sousveillance provides the contracting parties with multiple 
points-of-view and, hence, multiple perspectives that contest the authority’s control over the transaction 
(idem: 245-246). The notion of veillance for Mann and Ali is a constant reminder that information 
asymmetries provide an authority with power, a conclusion that they share with Foucault and Tufecki, as 
we have explained above. Mann and Ali’s understanding of power, to be clear, comes from Hannah 
Arendt’s definition: “the ability to voluntarily regulate, control, and make decisions in a social context” 
(idem: 249). Because of this, they argue, it should not come as a surprise that authority reacts to a 
diminishing of information asymmetry, and hence to a diminishing of power, with violence, which they 
understand to be “a kind of simulacrum of genuine power” (ibid.). There are a number of instances of 
violence evident in the manners in which states and corporations react to the contestation of their authority 
over information and communications. Journalists, whistleblowers, sociopolitical activists, opposition 
representatives and dissidents, non-governmental organizations, and even ordinary citizens, are submitted 
to a number of abuses as a result of surveillance (United Nations’ Human Rights Council 30th June 2014: 
5-7): intimidation, discrimination, and incarceration; espionage and smear campaigns; chilling effects; 
information blackouts; legislation approved in conditions of emergency or secrecy; and, brutal repression, 
torture, and—lastly—murder.  
 
For evident reasons, individual and collaborative actions of parrhesiastic sousveillance require strict 
countersurveillance strategies as well. Civil societies’ use of encryption for their information and 
communications has expand considerably in the past year (Wired 16th May 2014), NGOs are pushing for 
very specific freedom of information requests and carefully argued lawsuits against governments are being 
filed in courts, and international organizations such as the UN are contesting policies and practices of 
mass surveillance on the grounds that it does not comply with international human rights law (GigaOM 
16th July 2014). Civil societies across the world, thus, continue to contest the policies and practices of 
biopolitics of information and communications with which states and corporations attempt to ensure not 
only their economic and political power, but also their control over the access to and communication of 
information that can evidence and confront instances of abuses, unconstitutionalities, and corruption. The 
debate about states’ discourses that dishonestly claim an either/or policy scenario for security and civil 
liberties as well as about corporate narratives that shroud the monetization of internet users’ private data 
as a beneficial service is imperative for contemporary society. In a July 2014 interview, Snowden argues 
that the single most important factor that explains “the failures of oversight” that we have contemplated in 
most states should be thought about in terms of a lack of technical literacy. Every technology, he explains, 
is “a new system of communication, a new set of symbols, that people have to intuitively understand”. In 
our contemporary societies, laments Snowden, technical literacy is “a rare and precious resource” 
(Snowden 17th July 2014). 
 
The parrhesiastic and sousveillant contestation of global mass surveillance is based on the truthful fact that 
invasive and unlawful surveillance and collection of personal data from digital communications “may not 
only infringe on the right to privacy, but also on a range of other vital human rights” (Pillay 16th July 
2014). These sociopolitical efforts are already providing contemporary societies with a more solid grasp 
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on technical literacy, furthering their demand for the rule of law and democratic oversight, and 
strengthening their political agency along with a nascent digital agency. These threats and these 
achievements are the reasons why contemporary societies must remain seized on the debate, resolute in 
their legal questionings, steadfast in their socio-economo-political actions. As they continue to do so, they 
may prove Snowden right when he avows:  
 
Technology can actually increase privacy, but not if we sleepwalk into new applications 
of it without considering the implications of these new technologies. 
(Snowden 17th July 2014) 
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